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Abstract 
Defined Benefit (DB) pension risk management has traditionally focused on achieving a balance between 
the risks associated with the liabilities and the expected returns on investments. This approach does not 
capture the fact that a DB pension plan is part of running an overall business and must compete for 
capital against alternative investments the corporation can make. Pension funding strategies should be 
assessed against other corporate cash uses and strategies, such as investment in productive capacity, 
research and development initiatives, share or debt buybacks, or potential acquisitions. Considering 
pension funding relative to potential corporate actions within the same net present value (NPV), internal 
rate of return (IRR) or similar analytical framework, a company can optimise the use of available cash 
resources and balance alternative strategies against each other. 
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Chapter 13
The Funding Debate: Optimizing Pension Risk 
within a Corporate Risk Budget
Geoff Bauer, Gordon Fletcher, Julien Halfon, and Stacy Scapino
To assess the merits of using company cash to fund pension obligations instead 
of other corporate strategies, we believe a corporate finance approach is needed. 
Corporate finance theory generally suggests that companies should pursue pro-
jects offering returns above a certain hurdle rate for a given risk level. These 
approaches are more useful for decision-making in a multi-country environment 
than assessing each pension plan individually. By considering the pension fund-
ing policy alongside other potential corporate actions within the same net pre-
sent value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), or similar analytical framework, 
a company can further optimize the use of available cash resources and balance 
alternative strategies against each other.
In developing a model for determining whether to provide additional voluntary 
funding to pension plans, we begin with a ‘holistic’ view of a company’s financial 
statements, which we use to consider the pension plans and the employer cove-
nant alongside other balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement 
elements. This step establishes the nature and extent of the linkages between a 
company and its pension plan(s). Next we develop a risk optimization process and 
framework for selecting the optimal combination of pension funding, investment, 
and risk management strategies together with desired corporate activities. In par-
ticular, we discuss how to compare the relative merits of additional pension con-
tributions against other potential uses of available company resources and how to 
assess the impact on the covenant. We then extend the debate beyond the strategic 
aspects by outlining high-level governance and practical implementation issues. 
Last, we provide some examples of how certain companies have applied these con-
cepts in practice.
The Scale of the Global DB Pension Problem
At the end of 1999, large multinational company exposures to sizeable pension 
deficits and the perceived level of corporate risk related to the pension liability 
were considered to be quite limited and rarely mentioned as potential concerns. 
At that time, DB pension plan investment strategies typically had large equity 
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holdings and interest rates were higher than in the current environment, lead-
ing to lower liability valuations and, in some cases, decisions to take contribution 
holidays.
Conditions have changed in the wake of two significant global equity market 
corrections and a trend toward loose monetary policy across the largest developed 
countries. As Figure 13.1 shows, the total value of pension assets for 498 of the 
largest European and American multinationals have increased by 1.2 percent per 
annum over the past five years while their total liabilities increased by 2.5 percent 
per annum over this same period. As seen in Figure 13.2, these 498 multinational 
companies together made pension contributions of roughly €419 billion in total 
during this five-year period, at an average rate of €84 billion per year. While such 
efforts to eliminate pension deficits are notable, they have had little impact and 
one could even say that the past five years of pension contributions have been com-
pletely lost.
This global pension funding position has developed against a backdrop of cor-
porate deleveraging and considerable declines in market capitalization. Figure 
13.3 shows that for our sample of 498 multinational companies, total net debt 
declined from a peak of €12.1 trillion in 2007 to €10.8 trillion in 2011, while total 
market capitalization declined from €8.6 trillion to €8.2 trillion over this same 
period. Similarly, Figure 13.4 shows that their combined total net income declined 
from a peak of €837 billion in 2007 to €812 billion in 2011, while total free cash 
flow increased from €375 billion in 2007 to €832 billion in 2011 (although this is 
lower than the €1.2 trillion observed in 2009).1
Therefore, corporations have continued to make contributions to their DB 
pension plans despite the ongoing difficulties posed by the financial environment. 
Yet the continued existence of large pension deficits suggests they could probably 
have been more effective in the use of their cash. This analysis suggests two key 
points. First, pension plan investment and risk management strategies adopted by 
these companies were not suitably adapted to the changing nature of the market 
environment. Second, the considerable proportion of free cash flow used for pen-
sion contribution purposes may have been better invested elsewhere—potentially 
to boost core productive activities or enhance shareholder value.
A Holistic View of Pension Risk
To arrive at a framework and methodology for assessing whether a company 
should fund its DB pension liabilities or use its resources to pursue other corporate 
activities, one must understand the company’s options, as it chooses between pay-
ing additional, non-statutory contributions to a given pension plan or investing 
more into the business.
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Figure 13.1. Overall funding position on IAS 19 basis for 498 of the largest European 
and American multinationals.
Source: Authors’ compilation from annual financial statements.
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Figure 13.2. Total combined employer contributions for 498 of the largest European and 
American multinationals.
Source: Authors’ compilation of annual financial statements.
What Do DB Pension Plans Actually Mean for a 
Corporate Sponsor?
A company’s financial statements summarize its ability to generate returns for 
shareholders and provide a detailed understanding of the firm’s overall viability. 
A well-run company should always attempt to find the optimal balance between 
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its balance sheet, income/expenses, and cash flow objectives, to maximize the 
value of shareholder equity.
Companies with material pension exposures cannot define their key corporate 
objectives (e.g. valuation, earnings volatility, capital requirements, capital expen-
ditures, etc.) without considering their pension exposures and associated pension 
risks. Trying to achieve key corporate objectives without considering the potential 
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Figure  13.4. Total combined net income and free cash flow for 498 of the largest 
European and American multinationals.
Source: Authors’ compilation of annual financial statements.
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impact of pension risks creates imbalances that will affect the company’s ability 
to achieve its goals and the pension plan’s ability to meet long-term obligations. 
Within this context, one must consider what exactly a DB plan represents for a 
corporate sponsor.
Corporate sponsors have three levers to manage DB pension risks so that their 
impact is predictable and manageable: the funding strategy, the investment strat-
egy, and the risk management strategy. In turn these three levers determine how 
much money is paid into the plan, the trade-off between risk and expected return, 
and the specific actions that can be taken to reduce either the size or volatility of a 
DB pension deficit. The ideal balance between these levers depends on the sponsor’s 
financial health. For example, a very strong company may be able to accept higher 
levels of investment risk or higher contribution levels than a weaker company.
Corporate Risks
Any investment or strategic decision brings potential rewards but also exposes 
a corporation to a set of risks. As shown in Figure 13.5, these risks can be bro-
ken down into three: core business risks, other general risks, and financial risks. 
Together these risks provide the references against which the success of and return 
on any corporate strategy can be measured. For our purposes, we shall define 
corporate risks as any threat to a corporation’s objectives measured in financial 
terms, including all of the individual risks shown in Figure 13.5.
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Figure 13.5. Corporate risks.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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A company’s operations and internal functions, along with the wider economic 
and regulatory environment, impact its corporate risks. As shown in Figure 13.6, 
exposure to these corporate risks can in turn result in an unwanted adverse impact 
on the company’s financial statements and overall market standing.
Pension Risks
Pension liabilities and asset valuations affect pension risk; the latter arise as a result 
of changes in the market value of assets held to meet pension liabilities, the under-
lying nature of the pension benefits provided to plan members, the demographic 
profile of the membership group to which benefits are provided, and the financial 
and demographic assumptions used to place a value on the liabilities. At a con-
solidated corporate group level, aggregate pension risks are reflected in the com-
pany’s financial statements. Under the revised IAS 19 accounting standard, the 
full value of the pension deficit (or surplus) will be reflected on the consolidated bal-
ance sheet, while the consolidated income statement will reflect the total operating 
cost (i.e. service costs) and finance cost (i.e. the net-interest cost without allowance 
for subjective expected return on assets assumptions) from a company’s DB pen-
sion plans. Furthermore, the value of all actuarial gains and losses incurred during 
the year will be fully recognized through the consolidated statement of other com-
prehensive income, with the total value of pension contributions reflected in the 
Corporate
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Human
Regulation
Financing
Core Business
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Other
Create Affect
Balance Sheet
Earnings
Cash Flow
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Figure 13.6. Impact of corporate risks on key corporate metrics.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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 The Funding Debate 279
consolidated cash flow statement. Just as corporate risks affect corporate metrics, 
pension risks influence key pension metrics, as illustrated in Figure 13.7.
The Interaction Between Corporate Risks and 
Pension Risks
Pension risk drivers can be the same as the corporation’s risk drivers. For example, 
a large financial institution will most likely have considerable interest rate expo-
sure through its outstanding debt. In some cases, pension risk drivers can act as 
diversifiers or even offset some corporate risks when viewed within an enterprise 
risk management framework. For example, a utility company whose revenues are 
linked to inflation may be less worried about the level of inflation risk exposure in 
its pension plans. As a result, it is possible that decisions taken to manage pension 
risk may result in an increase in overall risk when the pension scheme and com-
pany are viewed together.
The asset-liability risks associated with a company’s DB pension plans can 
have a significant impact on the company’s financial risks; however, non-financial 
pension risks can also have an important impact on a company’s core business 
and other risks. Figure 13.8 shows how pension risks can be viewed within a 
corporate-wide risk budget.
A company’s pension deficit directly affects its balance sheet. The pension plan’s 
risk levels and key risk drivers determine pension deficit volatility. Consequently, 
Net debt
Market capitalization & share price
Credit ratings
Cash
Foreign suppliers and sales
Financial counterparty 
riskFI
N
A
N
CI
A
L 
RI
SK
S
Operational and strategic risks
(process, IT, systems, HR/talent,
M&A, R&D, etc.)
Regulatory and legal risks
(legal liabilities, social issues,
regulatory framework, etc.)CO
RE
 B
U
SI
N
ES
S
RI
SK
S
Financial risks
• Market
• Interest rate
• Ination
• Longevity
• FX
Counterparty risk
Talent and reward strategy
Employee engagement
Administration
Management and
governance
Regulatory environment
DB Pension Risk
DB Pension Risk
O
TH
ER
RI
SK
S
DB Pension Risk
Government policy
Life expectancy Climatic risks
Sovereign and political risks
Figure 13.8. Pension risks within an overall corporate risk budget.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
280 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
pension risk can cause increased volatility of total balance sheet liabilities, thereby 
affecting all corporate finance metrics that include the company’s total liabilities, 
such as net debt, enterprise value, or the company’s credit rating. Similarly, pen-
sion expense can dilute the company’s consolidated net earnings. Any earnings 
volatility arising from exposure to pension risks at a local level can, therefore, have 
a knock-on effect for the company’s dividend policy and other corporate finance 
metrics, including earnings measures such as net debt to EBITDA (earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) ratios. Finally, the pension 
contributions a company is required to make can ultimately drain overall free 
cash flow, thereby reducing its ability to develop its business and undertake profit-
able ventures.
Pension benefits can be met either from the pension plan’s existing assets (and 
the expected future return earned on these assets) or by making additional con-
tributions (i.e. the funding plan). A company considering additional contributions 
is essentially faced with a choice between contributing money to increase pen-
sion plan assets in the hope that these contributions and the associated additional 
investment returns will help minimize the probability that the company will 
have to meet pension obligations using additional financial resources,2 and using 
the available funds to invest in ‘corporate activities’ (i.e. invest in research and 
development, productive capacity, a debt or equity buyback program, or other 
similar activities). In the latter case, the pension plan is left either unfunded or 
underfunded for a period of time. The assumption is that the company’s financial 
position will be strengthened as a result of its other corporate activities and the 
stronger company should be better placed to meet its future pension obligations. 
The company is trying to ‘grow out of the pension problem’: a pension deficit of 
€50 million may be seen as a material problem for a company whose total value is 
€100 million but might be considered immaterial for a company whose total value 
is €1 billion.
The Pension Balance Sheet
When considering a DB plan in isolation, the employer covenant reflects the notion 
that the company bears ultimate responsibility for providing promised pension 
benefits; therefore, pension liabilities not backed by specific assets ear-marked for 
this purpose must be met from the company’s other resources (i.e. the employer 
covenant). Unfunded pension obligations are just another financial liability.
Corporate liabilities consist primarily of net pension obligations, debt, leases, 
and other financial obligations, while corporate assets are mostly composed of 
cash and other long-term real and financial assets. The question for the company 
is how best to structure its assets to meet its liabilities and maximize the value 
of shareholder equity. Decisions about the asset structure might look at contri-
butions and cash flow (described further on in the chapter), but will also include 
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decisions about investment and risk management strategies, which affect the bal-
ance sheet if they result in reduced volatility of the pension deficit.3 The company 
must find an acceptable balance between pension deficits and overall company 
debt capacity.
Deciding to leave the pension plan either unfunded or underfunded for a period 
of time might also be viewed as a form of inexpensive borrowing for companies, 
especially for those companies with high borrowing costs. This flexibility may 
be an attractive factor from a corporate finance perspective. On the other hand, 
companies may feel uncomfortable borrowing from employees. Importantly, 
this issue may be mitigated where there is some form of pension insolvency insur-
ance, such as the Pensions-Sicherungs-Verien (PSV) in Germany, the Pension 
Protection Fund (PPF) in the United Kingdom, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) in the United States.
The Pension Income Statement and the Statement 
of Other Comprehensive Income
Under the revised IAS 19 accounting standard, the annual cost of running a DB 
pension plan is the sum of total service costs (including current and past service 
costs plus any curtailment and settlement gains and losses recognized on the 
income statement), the net-interest cost recognized on the income statement, and 
‘re-measurements,’ including actuarial gains and losses, recognized in ‘other com-
prehensive income.’ By making additional contributions to a DB pension plan, the 
sponsoring firm could achieve a lower net-interest cost (ceteris paribus) and effect a 
transfer of some pension liabilities and risks,4 thus reducing the pension plan size 
and expense levels, or achieve a better degree of asset-liability matching,5 leading 
to less volatility in annual ‘re-measurements’ through the statement of other com-
prehensive income and on the balance sheet.
These potential benefits contrast with possible increases in operating or invest-
ment income should the company choose to invest in other corporate activities. In 
this case, the expected increase in earnings in the long term may overwhelm pen-
sion expense volatility in the short term. If an acceptable balance between pension 
deficit and deficit volatility on one hand and earnings dilution and volatility on 
the other is not reached, there could be a material impact on the valuation of the 
company and/or the strength of the covenant.
The Pension Cash Flow Statement
Using an example of a single underfunded DB pension plan, and assuming that 
the sponsor is not required to fund the deficit in advance, we can look at the choice 
between making no immediate contributions to the plan, making a large con-
tribution up front, and making regular but relatively smaller contributions over 
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time. A graphical illustration of each of these choices is provided in Figures 13.9, 
13.10, and 13.11.
If the company does not make immediate contributions, the pension plan’s 
benefit payments will be met from the plan assets in prior years. When these assets 
are expended, the rest of the liability cash flows must be covered by the employer. 
In this case, the company will be left free to invest in corporate activities in the 
early years until the point in the future when it will need to cover the ongoing ben-
efit payments from its own operating cash flow. If the company were to consider 
monetizing the existing pension covenant by making additional contributions 
to the pension plan, it could do so by front-end loading the required contribu-
tion. Under this option, the hope is that that this contribution, along with the 
additional returns earned on the investment, would be sufficient to meet ongoing 
benefit payments with no further sponsor involvement. Alternatively, the com-
pany could make regular contributions over time, which might balance the need 
(or priority) to invest in corporate activities with the potential objective of reduc-
ing the requirement for additional sponsor investment in the future. The selected 
approach constrains to some extent the company’s non-pension investment pro-
gram and can affect the long-term strength of the pension covenant. Structuring 
additional contributions should reflect a balance between the level and timing of 
contributions needed to meet the legal and regulatory funding requirements of 
the pension plans, which differ greatly across countries, and pursue other planned 
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business initiatives, including capital expenditure and the scheduled repayment of 
existing company borrowings.
The shape of the contribution schedule is important. Ideally corporate spon-
sors should take account of liquidity constraints and attempt to customize the 
schedule to meet the objectives, needs, and preferences of both the pension plan 
and the corporate sponsor.
Optimizing Pension Risk within the Overall 
Corporate Context
Achieving corporate objectives often requires a detailed understanding of and a 
sound framework for managing, optimizing, and governing various exposures 
and risks, including pensions. Additionally, a corporate sponsor’s financial health 
is instrumental in ensuring its pension plans’ long-term capacity to meet their obli-
gations. Without some objective way to consider and compare the different risks 
and potential returns from changes in strategies, a company cannot adequately 
assess how much pension risk it can afford to take, where risks can be taken to 
ensure they are satisfactorily rewarded, which risks need to be hedged or trans-
ferred, and which risks need to be governed.
To this end, we focus on the processes that can help optimize and govern pen-
sion risks. This can be achieved in three phases. First, a risk optimization process 
is required, where changes in funding, investment, and risk management strate-
gies are analyzed in terms of their impacts on corporate metrics and objectives. 
This is then supplemented by a cost/benefit analysis to determine the relative 
merits of each alternative pension strategy and how changes to the pension risk/
return profile affect the sponsor covenant. Last, another cost/benefit analysis will 
be carried out to compare the best pension strategy to other corporate options 
available.
Optimizing the Pension Risk and Return Profile
Ideally the plan sponsor will form a view on the level of pension risk that might 
be regarded as acceptable, tolerable, or desirable. At a corporate level, aggre-
gate pension risk must be commensurate with the sponsor’s capacity to absorb 
potential costs/losses. For example, for a company sponsoring multiple pension 
plans, reducing pension risks in one or more plans may allow additional risk to 
be taken in other core business activities within the overall risk budget. But for 
the sponsor to appreciate the scale of its pension risk, it must specify an overall 
pension risk limit that reflects risk levels in its pension plan(s) and the impact that 
these risks have on wider corporate metrics. The steps set out below can be used 
to achieve this.
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Identify Corporate Objectives and Key Corporate Metrics
Key corporate metrics and ratios determine the extent to which corporate objec-
tives have been met. These metrics must include traditional valuation metrics, 
such as the stability of earnings, the level of net debt, earnings targets, etc., and 
sector and company-specific ones (e.g. the Basel 2 capital requirements for bank-
ing institutions, cash flow levels for utilities, etc.).
With a Detailed Understanding of the Overall Corporate 
Objectives, Develop ‘Proxy Corporate-Pension Metrics’
Simple ‘proxy corporate-pension metrics’ can combine corporate metrics 
and pension metrics such as the following ratios: net pension deficit as percent-
age of market cap and/or net debt, pension expense as percentage of net earn-
ings, pension-driven net earnings volatility, and contributions as percentage of 
pension-adjusted free cash flow.
Companies may also consider more complex ratios as proxies, using 
pension-adjusted figures such as funds from operations (FFO)/pension-adjusted 
net debt, pension-adjusted net debt/EBITDA, and pension-adjusted net debt/
capital. The appropriate metrics vary from sector to sector. Individual company 
circumstances can lead to different levels of importance attached to each met-
ric. These ‘proxy corporate-pension metrics’ should illustrate the materiality of a 
company’s pension exposures, while their volatility provides an indication of pen-
sion risk levels and their potential impact on the company.
Set an Explicit Limit on the Level of Pension Risk Regarded as 
Acceptable, Tolerable, or Desirable
For companies valued on the basis of Net Debt to EBITDA or enterprise value to 
EBITDA ratios, a simple risk limit could be specified as a maximum value for the 
ratio of either [pension-adjusted net debt + one-year 95 percent Value-at-Risk]6 
to pension-adjusted EBITDA or [Pension-adjusted enterprise value less one-year 
95 percent Value-at-Risk] to pension-adjusted EBITDA.
For others, the dilution of earnings from DB pensions and the corresponding 
volatility can give a good indication of pension cost in terms of overall company 
valuation. For such companies, one might consider ratios such as the volatility of 
net earnings to the volatility of net earnings excluding the pension expense or, 
alternatively, net earnings (current pension expense + impact of one-year 95 per-
cent Value-at-Risk on expected pension expense) to net earnings (current pension 
expense).
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The appropriate definition of  a risk limit is complex and must reflect the com-
pany’s specific circumstances and objectives. The risk budget is likely to be multi-
faceted with several risk limits, including the maximum increase in deficit over a 
given period of  time, the maximum value of  additional contribution over a given 
period of  time, or the maximum increase in pension expense over a given period 
of  time.
Develop Alternative Pension Funding, Investment, and 
Risk Management Strategies Focused on Meeting Desired 
Return Objectives While Remaining Within the Set Risk 
Limits
To ensure pension risk is within the acceptable levels set out in the previous step, 
a range of strategies must be considered, including changes to planned pension 
funding or the period over which funding will occur, changes to investment strat-
egy (i.e. asset allocation, diversification within asset classes, and hedge ratios), and 
other risk management options (e.g. initiatives to reshape the size or profile of the 
liabilities, risk transfer options, and alternative finance solutions).
Bringing pension risk to an acceptable limit may require contributing money 
and using contributions to affect the investment strategy or risk management 
changes. These additional contributions may affect other corporate activities, so 
the combined overall pension and corporate strategy should be fully analyzed. 
The sponsor must decide whether making additional pension contributions as 
part of a revised contribution policy or funding strategy is preferable to using the 
available cash elsewhere in the sponsor’s business.
Assess the Appropriateness of a Given Investment and Risk 
Management Strategy for the Pension Plan Based on the 
Pre-Defined ‘Proxy Corporate-Pension Metrics,’ Acceptable 
Risk Limits, and Other Evaluation Criteria Such as NPV, IRR, 
etc.
One must maintain consistency when comparing pension funding and corpo-
rate investment decisions. One way to maintain consistency is to complement the 
‘proxy corporate-pension metrics’ and acceptable risk limits defined earlier with 
risk-adjusted hurdle rates, IRR, or NPV, so pension strategies can be compared to 
other alternatives.
Any single available pension or corporate strategy cannot be considered in iso-
lation; as noted above, it is the overall pension and corporate strategy that must 
be analyzed. For example, consider a company with a material pension deficit 
faced with a simplified decision between contributing money into its pension plans 
to remove the deficit and buy out the liabilities with an insurance company, or 
continuing with its existing contribution policy, using available cash resources to 
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develop, say, a new production plant over the next ten years. In this example, the 
appropriate comparison is between (a) the risk-adjusted NPV or IRR for the com-
pany’s ongoing business initiatives, including the initial cash contribution to settle 
the pension liabilities, but without any future balance sheet or earnings volatility 
or any potential cash calls from DB pension plans; and (b) the risk-adjusted NPV 
or IRR for the company’s ongoing business initiatives and the new production 
plant, but taking into account the impact on this risk-adjusted NPV or IRR of  the 
remaining pension risks (and hence the potential need for additional future pen-
sion contributions).
If this example company pursued the second option, and a new medical break-
through resulted in a substantial increase in life expectancy, the financial analy-
sis of the company’s business initiatives and new production plant could remain 
unchanged. The increased cost of having to pay pension benefits for significantly 
longer periods of time may make it difficult for the company to effectively com-
plete its planned development of the new production plant. Allowance for such 
factors may reduce the NPV of this option.
Two pension investment and risk management strategies can have similar risk/
return profiles, yet different overall impacts and combined NPV or IRR results. 
A feedback loop can help separate strategies that increase the strength and value 
of the covenant (e.g. generate positive NPV) from those that decrease it.
Select the Most Effective Pension Strategy from those Deemed 
Appropriate by Ensuring that Risk Is Taken in the Most Efficient 
Manner and that the Combined Pension and Corporate 
Strategies and Activities Maximize the Chosen Evaluation Criteria
The main differentiating factor between different strategies remains the overall 
impact on the covenant. This impact is best captured using evaluation criteria like 
NPV or IRR.
Risk should be taken in areas that are expected to be rewarded and any poten-
tial diversification benefits between different risk sources should be maximized. 
In deciding which strategy is most efficient, one must consider both the company’s 
views and factors specific to the company and its operating environment. An illus-
tration of how this framework might work in practice is shown in Figure 13.12.
Governance and Implementation 
Considerations
In the extended framework set out above, a company must ensure that the process 
for comparing alternative strategies is rigorous and reliable. Consequently, spon-
sors would do well to consider the implications of these decisions from a govern-
ance and implementation perspective.
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Governance Implications of the Funding Debate 
Framework
The framework and approach advocated has several distinct advantages for 
managing pension risk. Nevertheless, these methods introduce complexity 
because a company may need to implement various corporate and pension 
strategies simultaneously. This increased complexity requires robust governance 
and monitoring. In particular, a company must be aware of  implementation 
requirements for a given pension or corporate action, the need for coordina-
tion between different services, geographies or lines of  business, potential dis-
parities between different stakeholders, advisors, and providers (which would 
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require the sponsor to clearly define responsibilities and assign them to named 
individuals, define policies and processes, articulate risk tolerances, implement 
a forward-looking monitoring process, and manage internal and external com-
munications), and the potential need for the company to take corrective action 
in the face of  unfavorable outcomes and its capacity to actually develop and take 
such actions.
Understanding Cash Sources
Another dimension that must be considered is whether potential pension contri-
butions are sourced from excess cash within the business or raised on the market. 
This decision could affect the level of relative leveraging in the company’s bal-
ance sheet and the company’s long-term borrowing capacity. In certain indus-
tries, companies may have a regulatory arbitrage opportunity. Although the cost 
of capital is assumed to be the same, changes in the company’s debt-to-equity ratio 
as a result of raising the funds externally should be considered. Tax considerations 
and the existence of potential tax shields should also be taken into account when 
determining the most appropriate source of additional cash.
Implementation Constraints
One reason for testing and ranking many alternative strategies is that structural 
and organizational limitations can affect their implementation. For example, 
the sponsor may not be capable of making additional contributions as its finan-
cial standing is weak, or due to liquidity issues. This affordability constraint may 
limit the universe and nature of the pension strategies and activities that can be 
implemented. Alternatively, legal and regulatory requirements might determine 
the way in which pensions are financed. For example, in the Netherlands or the 
United Kingdom, companies are required by regulation to make pension contri-
butions if their pension plan solvency falls below some pre-defined short-term or 
long-term level.
Furthermore, the company may run into opposition from trustees or other 
third parties. For example, in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, DB plans 
are typically set up as trust arrangements with a set of fiduciaries that have ulti-
mate responsibility for investment strategy and compliance with local funding 
requirements. If the merits of the company’s pension decisions cannot be com-
municated clearly to such third parties, it is entirely possible that their opposition 
could complicate matters significantly and, in the worst case, could render the 
entire approach impossible.
If the most favored strategy is not implementable, the company may well need 
to consider whether the second or third ranked strategies (shown in the previous 
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figure) would be sensible and desirable, and whether this approach could offer an 
attractive strategy that can actually be carried out in practice.
Practical Application of the Proposed Framework
Our suggested framework provides companies with an innovative way to assess 
the relative merits of using available cash for pension funding. Moreover, we are 
aware of a number of cases where companies have successfully applied some of 
its individual components. This is because companies are increasingly evaluat-
ing pension funding decisions with reference to the potential impact these deci-
sions could have on their key performance indicators and business plans, rather 
than just considering changes in typical ‘pension-only’ metrics like Value-at-
Risk. One such example comes from a large European telecom firm with sig-
nificant pension liabilities. This company was faced with calls from their largest 
plan’s trustee to adopt a very prudent long-term funding target; by considering 
the specific components of their core business that could offset pension risks to 
some extent and how the pension deficit (and risk) was expected to develop over 
time relative to the expected progression of the employer covenant, the com-
pany was able to demonstrate that it would need to increase the current level 
of risk in the pension plan by 50 percent in order to have a reasonable chance 
of meeting the trustee’s prudent funding target. The company was then able to 
clearly illustrate the potential detrimental impact that this risk increase could 
have on its debt and equity holders, and how the increased risk might impact the 
perceived strength of the covenant in the shorter term and, hence, the security of 
member benefits. In this way, the company was able to negotiate a pension con-
tribution policy that did not adversely impact its development plans and ensured 
that pension risk levels relative to the employer covenant were reasonable in 
future years.
A second example comes from a European bank that has developed an 
approach to pension risk monitoring as set out above. The bank identified the 
financial metrics most important to its shareholders and then restated these met-
rics to explicitly include the size and potential volatility of global DB liabilities. 
As a result, the bank gained better control over global risk exposures, with the 
ability to quantify and qualify risk sources and evaluate the impact of pension risk 
on its capital requirements. This provided the bank with an ‘early warning sys-
tem’ to identify when risk limits were close to being breached and provided senior 
management with a better understanding of the potential impact that pension risk 
management actions could have on their key financial metrics. The bank has now 
also developed a governance framework with clearly defined responsibilities for 
identifying potential risk management and investment opportunities.
Furthermore, companies and external stakeholders (e.g. equity and credit rat-
ing analysts) appear to have increasingly greater appreciation for the potential 
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positive impact that reducing or removing pension risks can have on expected 
future company performance, even if this involves substantial initial contri-
butions that might have been used elsewhere in the business. For example, in 
mid-2012, a large U.S. manufacturing company announced an offer of lump sum 
payments to a significant percentage of salaried retirees in the U.S., with other 
retirees offered a continued monthly pension, insured by a large U.S. insurance 
company. The company contributed approximately $4 billion to help fund a 
group annuity contract purchase and improve the funded status of the pension 
plan for active employees. The company took a one-off charge to earnings of 
approximately $3 billion, as well as an ongoing annual reduction in earnings 
of approximately $200 million. Despite the substantial additional contribution 
requirements and the reduction in overall company earnings, reactions from 
investors and credit rating agencies were positive to neutral. The successful com-
pletion alleviated many concerns that the market would view accounting charges 
unfavorably.
Conclusion
For many companies, DB pension liabilities are material and can have a signifi-
cant impact on their ability to achieve the firm’s business objectives. Consequently, 
companies increasingly need an integrated governance and pension risk manage-
ment framework that will allow them to evaluate the relative merits of using cash 
to fund pension obligations versus using it for other corporate objectives. There is 
no simple solution to the pension problem; we have argued here that the answer 
lies in adopting a corporate finance approach. While we have yet to see a company 
fully adopt the framework set out here, there are clear examples that many corpo-
rations are moving in this direction. We believe this momentum will continue and 
that companies adopting a corporate finance approach will be far better placed to 
manage DB pension risk in the future.
Appendix: Defining the ‘Sponsor’s Covenant’
As with other company debtors, the company owes money to pension plan(s) that 
it sponsors. For a pension plan, the value of the sponsor’s financial support is cru-
cial if it wants to meet the pension obligations of its members. The ‘sponsor’s cov-
enant’ in relation to a pension plan is defined as ‘the combination of (a) the ability 
and (b) the willingness of the sponsor to pay (or the ability of the trustees to require 
the sponsor to pay) sufficient advance contributions to ensure that the scheme’s 
benefits can be paid as they fall due’ (IFoA 2005).
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If a company is looking for a solution that leaves it free to pursue its corporate 
agenda while ensuring DB pension risk is well managed, it might look to maxi-
mize the value of the sponsor’s covenant and reach a balanced position where 
corporate finance and pension risk management decisions are optimized.
Notes
 1.  Free cash flow is taken to be cash flow from operating activities less total capital 
expenditure.
 2.  In this example, ‘money’ is intended to capture not only direct cash contributions but 
also the transfer of a wide range of contingent or conditional assets.
 3.  With the changes in IAS 19 disclosure requirements, deficit volatility will feed into the 
balance sheet through recognition in Other Comprehensive Income.
 4.  In this example, risk transfer is intended to cover liability management exercises, such 
as enhanced transfer values or pension increase exchange, as well as either a partial or 
complete buy-in or buyout.
 5.  To the extent that additional contributions are used to reduce risky assets and increase 
hedging.
 6.  Value-at-Risk is the potential increase in pension deficit that would be expected to 
occur over a given time horizon with a defined probability and is typically measured in 
monetary terms.
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